Ukraine update: Russia tries to counter Ukraine's counterattack … and fails

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At this morning’s press event at the U.S. Department of Defense, Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Hilbert quoted Ukrainian sources in saying that, “The worst thing the Russians did was give us eight years to prepare.” During that time, Ukrainian forces worked closely with the American military, including seeing numerous National Guard forces who spent extensive time in Ukraine training and working with the military there.

Through that association, the Ukrainian military took the U.S. focus on training (and training, and more training) “strongly to heart.” Ukrainian forces also saw something in the way U.S. forces were structured—especially  something that kos has talked about several times, the value of non-commissioned officers. 

Russia continued a top heavy command layout, based their strategy around an army of untrained conscripts, and reshaped their military structure around small, fragile battalion tactical groups. Ukraine implemented a program to insert and retain NCOs, doubled down on training that included training on complex strategies, and beefed up their brigade structure to improve redundancy and strength in depth. 

All of that took time, which is why Ukrainian officials are glad that this invasion, if it had to come, came in 2022, not 2016, or 2018. There is no good time for a war, but the interval between Russia’s first and second advantage was time Ukraine spent preparing themselves at every level to do what they’re doing right now.

At the afternoon session, reporters expressed concern about the missiles that Russia has been firing into western Ukraine, including at cities that had previously been spared bombardment. Many of those missiles have been directed at electrical substations, at rail infrastructure, and at factories connected with Ukraine’s defense. The Pentagon agrees that the intention of these missiles is to disrupt the flow of weapons entering the country and decrease Ukraine’s ability to “replenish and reinforce” their positions. On Tuesday, two of the missiles fired were reportedly the high speed Kalibr missiles launched from a Russian ship in the Black Sea.

The missile attacks are continuing on Wednesday. The total number of missiles Russia has launched since the invasion began is now over 2,300.

However, the U.S. notes that Russia still has a poor record when it comes to precisely hitting targets, that Russia’s “ability to target with precision has been less than advertised”, and they’ve had a lack of accuracy over the last 70 days. Without giving details, the spokesperson hinted that Russia may still not be making contact with the targets it really wants to hit.

Though they would not give any numbers to tie it down, the DOD insists that Ukraine is still seeing new weapons and supplies come into the country at “an incredible pace” and that those weapons are still reaching the front on a timely basis. The Pentagon also indicated that some of the U.S. M777 howitzers sent to Ukraine are now in use.

Also in the afternoon session, the Pentagon noted that both Army and National Guard units were involved with training Ukrainian forces in Germany (along with possible use of Air Force units to train on the new Phoenix Ghost, details of which are still obscure). While discussing this, the Pentagon stated that Ukrainian forces had also been trained on the use of “unmanned surface vessels”  — in other words, drone ships. 

Finally, while assessing that Russia is not making the progress that they want, the Pentagon said it believes Russia is still having problems with command, unit coordination, unit cohesion, and morale. Even so, Russia still has “a lot of firepower left to them to continue this fight. This could be a prolonged battle in the Donbas.”

That remark matches some coming from of Ukrainian officials this week, who appear to be warning their nation to prepare for an extended war.

Kharkiv

For the last week, Ukrainian forces have been conducting a steady counterattack in the area north and east of Kharkiv. At the start of this offensive, Russian forces were right on the boundaries of the city, but Ukraine pushed those forces out of the suburbs, out of the nearby towns, and back through a series of villages to open a 40 km (25 mile) corridor around the battered city. The Ukrainian counterattack took them into Staryi Saltiv earlier in the week and has largely cleared forces east of the city to the Siverskyi Donets River.

Ukraine’s attempts to clear Russian forces, which apparently include a lot of Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) militia, hasn’t gone off without a hitch. On Monday, Ukrainian forces attempting to enter the town of Kozacha Lopan ran into stiff resistance, losing several vehicles in the process. However, Ukrainian forces remain just a short distance away, but at the moment the biggest area of combat seems to be over on the east end of this line — where it seems, as of Wednesday evening, Ukraine has succeeded in driving Russian forces completely from Staryi Saltiv. There are also some statements that Ukraine has taken the town of Shestakove, which would go a long way to clear the main road between Staryi Saltiv and Kharkiv, but this is currently unconfirmed.

However, also on Wednesday, Russia apparently attempted to counter-counterattack. The location isn’t clear, though it seems to be back at the northwest end of the area, once again near that town of Kozacha Lopan, where Ukrainian forces were pushed back earlier. However, Russia’s attempt to recapture territory from Ukraine in this area has reportedly failed.

How Russian tanks are dictated by Russian strategy, and vice versa

As of Wednesday, Oryx is reporting more than 3,400 pieces of Russian equipment that have been lost. Over 600 of those are lost tanks, and a huge chunk of those is some form of T-72.  Just as with the structure of their army, the nature of their tanks is defined by the expectation of Russian leaderships. And then the nature of what the army can do, is defined by those tanks.

“The biggest advantage with the T-72 is also its biggest weakness. Because this vehicle was designed to be used by a conscript army. So it’s easy to operate. But that’s also its biggest weakness, because a conscript army cannot pull off sophisticated tank tactics. It’s supposed to be easy to maintain, but that’s not the case if all of your corrupt generals are stealing the funds that are meant to be used for maintaining the vehicles.”